Evolution, social norms, and the sustainability of common property resources.
ATZENHOFFER, Jean-Philippe
(2011)
Evolution, social norms, and the sustainability of common property resources.
Thèses de doctorat, Full text available as:
AbstractNumerous natural common-pool resources such as fisheries, forests, or pastures, are facing overexploitation pressure. To understand the underlying reasons of resource degradation, economists have extensively used concepts of standard game theory. Yet, many empirical and experimental studies have shown that resource exploiters do not always behave according to the Nash predictions. In addition to the standard analysis, evolutionary game theory represents a useful and relevant tool to model human behaviour. By assuming that agents adapt progressively their behaviour, notably through imitation, it becomes possible to account for results obtained in the empirical and experimental literature. Basically, this thesis contains three applications of evolutionary game theory to the problem of the commons (chapter 4, 5 and 6). In the first one, we propose a model which explains situations where common resources are severely overexploited, even to a larger extend than the Nash prediction. In a second model, we show that extractive pressures can be restrained when agents have the possibility to sanction those who overexploit. In the third model, we study how local communities can limit their exploitation level by setting up a system of private property rights over the resource.
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